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AGAINST SONDERHOLM: STILL COMMITTED TO EXPRESSIVISM 
by DANIEL ELSTEIN 
This is the accepted version of the following article: Elstein, D. (2007), Against Sonderholm: Still 
Committed to Expressivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 107: 111–116, which 
has been published in final form at ht p://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
9264.2007.00213.x/abstract  
ABSTRACT: Jorn Sonderholm (2005) has argued that Simon Blackburn’s commitment 
semantics for evaluative discourse is unable to explain the validity of 
simple inferences involving disjunction. This is true insofar as the basic 
rules which Blackburn suggests are not strong enough, but it is relatively 
simple to augment those rules so as to meet Sonderholm’s challenge, 
whilst respecting the spirit of commitment semantics. One way of doing 
this is to add a reduction rule such that if accepting p commits one to 
inconsistent commitments, one is committed to accepting ¬p. Thus 
Sonderholm has not provided any reason to doubt the adequacy of 
commitment semantics to explain validity in evaluative discourse. 
 
Jorn Sonderholm (2005) presents a difficulty for Simon Blackburn’s commitment 
semantics for evaluative discourse. Blackburn aims to provide an explanation of our 
acceptance of various inference patterns that does not require validity to be defined in 
terms of truth-preservation. Such an account appears necessary for defending 
expressivism, the view that moral utterances express attitudes. Accordingly he 
characterises valid inferences as ones where accepting the premises and rejecting the 
conclusion results in inconsistent commitments. Sonderholm points out that as it stands 
Blackburn’s account is unable to validate certain simple arguments involving 
disjunction, the most basic of which is the inference: 
 (p v p)ｦ p 
Blackburn interprets the disjunction p v q as two conditional commitments: if ¬p is 
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accepted, accept q, and if ¬q is accepted, accept p. This is symbolised as [A(¬p)  
A(q)] & [A(¬ q) s A(p)]. Sonderholm explains that Blackburn cannot deduce an 
inconsistent set of commitments from accepting the premise of the inference in question 
whilst not accepting its conclusion. An attempted proof will proceed as follows, 
stopping before an inconsistency is reached: 
 1 (1) [A(¬p) s A(p)] & [A(¬p) s A(p)]   1 ASS 
 2 (2) ¬A(p)       2 ASS 
 1 (3) A(¬p) s A(p)      1 &E1 
 1,2 (4) ¬A(¬p)       2,3 MTT 
Sonderholm rightly says that this argument could be completed if we were allowed a 
rule (K) such that ¬A(¬A)  A(A), and that this rule is unacceptable: refusing to 
reject p is not the same as accepting p. There is, however, a different rule that would 
allow us to complete the argument: a reduction rule which says that if one is 
conditionally committed to absurdity on accepting A, then one is committed to 
accepting ¬A. We can symbolise this as [A(A)ｦ A()]  A(¬A). We want to 
generalise this rule to cases where it is only on certain assumptions that accepting A 
commits one to accepting absurdity, in which case it is only given those assumptions 
that one is committed to accepting ¬A. Thus the full reduction rule is: 
(R) , [, A(A)ｦ A()]  A(¬A)1 
This licenses running the argument as follows, now deducing A(p) directly, rather than 
showing that the premiss is inconsistent with ¬A(p): 
 1 (1) [A(¬p) s A(p)] & [A(¬p) s A(p)]   1 ASS 
 1 (2) A(¬p) s A(p)      1 &E1 
 3 (3)  A(¬p)       SUPP 
 1,3 (4)  A(p)       2,3 MP 
 1,3 (5)  A()       3,4 
                                                 
1 Here and throughout ‘’ is a schematic letter for any wff, whereas ‘A’ is a schematic letter for any string 
(not containing any occurrences of the A(…) acceptance operator) such that ‘A(A)’ is a wff. 
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 1 (6) A(¬¬p)       2-5 R 
 1 (7) A(p)       6 N2 
The strategy also works for Sonderholm’s less simple case: the inference [(p&q) v 
(p&r)]ｦ p: 
 1 (1) [A¬(p&q) s A(p&r)] & [A¬(p&r) s A(p&q)]3 1 ASS 
 1 (2) A¬(p&q) s A(p&r)     1 &E1 
 3 (3) A(¬p)       SUPP 
 3 (4) A¬(p&q)      3 J4 
 3 (5) A¬(p&r)      3 J 
 1,3 (6) A(p&r)      2,4 MP 
 1,3 (7) A()       5,6 
 1 (8) A(¬¬p)       2-7 R 
 1 (9) A(p)       8 N 
It is worth mentioning four possible concerns. The first is that rule R and rule K are 
equivalent; if this were so then my reply would be in no better shape than the one which 
Sonderholm rightly rejects. But the rules are not equivalent: R is weaker than K. There 
are circumstances where one does not accept ¬p, but accepting ¬p would not involve 
absurdity. According to rule K one is committed to accepting p, but rule R does not 
apply. 
The next worry is that I play fast and loose with absurdity: there is a difference between 
the internal contradiction involved in the combination A(p) and A(¬p), and the external 
contradiction in A(p) and ¬A(p). I concede the point, and that is why I use the 
expression ‘A()’ rather than ‘’ when internal contradiction is in play,  but if my 
                                                 
2 N is the rule that A(¬¬A)  A(A). We are entitled to assume a commitment to classicism. 
3 Note that there is something dubious about Sonderholm’s translation here, because we should be 
unwilling to allow ‘A¬(p&q)’ as a wff, since it clearly means the same as ‘A(¬p v ¬q)’, which Blackburn 
disallows. It would be better to paraphrase the former in the same way as the l tter. In the text we give 
Sonderholm the benefit of the doubt in framing his alleged counterexample. 
4 J is the rule that A(¬A)  A¬(A&B). This rule is eliminable, because both A(¬A) s [A(A) s A(¬B)] 
and A(¬A) s [A(B) s A(¬A)] are theorems, and so A(¬A) s {[A(A) s A(¬B)] & [A(B) s 
A(¬A)]} is also a theorem. The latter is equivalent to A(¬A) s A¬(A&B), so J is a shorthand, rather 
than a substantive addition to the system. 
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symbolism offends, feel free to substitute a different symbol. The crucial point is that 
we have a standing commitment to avoiding contradiction, and this is reflected in our 
use of reductio reasoning. Anyone who accepts reductio reasoning must accept rule R, 
since what rule R records is simply our commitment to accepting the results of reductio 
reasoning. Those points are the ones on which my reply stands, and they are unaffected 
by quibbles about what ‘absurdity’ means. 
A third concern is that rule R commits us to accepting a contradiction.5 If we let L be the 
liar sentence (‘This sentence is false’), then both we get both A(L) s A() and A(¬L) 
s A() as theorems. But then R allows to deduce both A(¬L) and A(L), so it turns out 
that A() is a theorem! But it is if anything an advantage for commitment semantics that 
it takes the Liar to be paradoxical. It is not as if standard reduction rules can cope 
consistently with the Liar; truth-conditional semantics is thus a companion in guilt. So 
this worry is only worth taking seriously if the expressivist’s opponent has her own 
solution to the Liar, which cannot be adapted to commitment semantics. If commitment 
semantics has the same problem with the Liar that everyone else does, that counts as a 
success (albeit an odd one) for expressivists in stealing the clothes of realists. 
The most serious worry is that my reply has the advantage of theft over honest toil. 
After all, the point of Blackburn’s project is to explain why we are inclined to accept 
certain inferences. But I am just taking it for granted that reductio inferences are 
acceptable. Clearly this would not be acceptable as a general strategy: whenever a valid 
argument is presented that commitment semantics in its present form cannot deal with, 
invent a rule licensing the argument. On the other hand, the expressivist must be 
allowed some materials to work with. Blackburn takes as basic rules that (are tailored 
to) validate modus ponens and modus tollens. Sonderholm has demonstrated that 
Blackburn’s rules are insufficient for all the arguments we want to validate. The 
                                                 
5 I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this problem to my attention. 
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following rules seem sufficient6: 
(sI)  ｦ ]  [s ] 
(MP)  [s ],   
(&I)   ,   [& ] 
(&E1)  [& ]  
(&E2)  [& ]  
(¬I)  , [, ｦ ]  ¬
(¬E)  ¬¬   
(R)  , [, A(A)ｦ A()]  A(¬A) 
(N)  A(¬¬A)  A(A) 
The need for R and N follows from the obvious point that once there is a distinction 
between internal and external negation, there need to be rules for internal negation 
introduction and elimination, and R and N are natural parallels of the classical rules for 
negation. Ideally we would like a meta-proof of the conservativeness of these rules with 
respect to classical logic.8 Here is a sketch of such a proof: 
The rules above are conservative just in case we can derive either an external 
contradiction (A(p) and ¬A(p)) or an internal contradiction9 (A(p) and A(¬p)) from a set 
of wffs iff we can derive a contradiction from the correct translation of that set in the 
propositional calculus. The central difference between commitment semantics and the 
propositional calculus is that when the latter has a negated wff e.g. ‘¬p’, the correct 
translation in commitment semantics may be either ‘¬A(p)’ or ‘A(¬p)’, depending on 
                                                 
6 Assuming that we do not have internal conjunction – see footnotes 3 and 4. 
 Note that this rule covers ¬¬A(A)ｦ A(A), since the acceptable substitutions for ‘’ are a superset of the 
acceptable substitutions for ‘A(A)’ (see note 1). If this sub-rule seems controversial, consider that all it 
amounts to is that non-non-acceptance commits one to acceptance. If we translate sentences of English 
involving non-non-acceptance by ‘¬¬A(A)’, and ones involving acceptance by ‘A(A)’, then the sub-rule 
is evidently sound. 
8 I do not mean that the expressivist is committed to providing such a proof.
9 If the contradiction is internal then taking the internal negation of a conclusion as a supposition and 
applying R and N will only allow us to derive conclusions of the form ‘A(A)’, so there may appear to be a 
breakdown of ex falso quodlibet. But it will be legitimate to assume that the only at mic sentences are of 
that form too, so in fact ex falso quodlibet will hold. 
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what sentence of natural language ‘¬p’ is a translation of. Whichever translation is 
correct, it must be applied uniformly to all occurrences of ‘¬p’, since otherwise we are 
admitting that there is an equivocation in the argument as rendered in the propositional 
calculus. When external negation is the correct translation, there is no problem, because 
then R and N can be ignored and the other rules above are a complete classical system 
when the possibility of internal negation is off the table. When internal negation is used, 
we take advantage of the fact that, in the propositional calculus, for any wff in which 
negation has broad scope with respect to some other connective it is possible to give a 
logically equivalent wff where negation takes narrow scope. This can be done even 
when we restrict ourselves to the connectives ‘&’, ‘’, and ‘¬’. And this suffices to 
show that the rules above excluding ¬I and ¬E are a complete classical system, ignoring 
the possibility of external negation.  Once we put the wffs of the propositional calculus 
into the form of narrow-scope negation, proofs of contradiction will even proceed 
isomorphically to proofs of internal contradiction in commitment semantics. So 
however negation is translated, the conservativeness condition is satisfied. Whilst it is 
true that commitment semantics allows for wffs with both internal and external 
negation, this just shows the greater expressive power of commitment semantics, and 
such cases are irrelevant to whether it is conservative. 
The simplicity in the set of rules required should allow my proposal to count as a reply 
in the spirit of Blackburn’s project. That project is to reconstruct the validity of all valid 
inferences from the acceptance of a set of rules designed to validate a small set of basic 
inferences. Reductio arguments can legitimately be seen as part of this basic set, which 
gives expressivists a right to rule R. It would be unfair to Blackburn to say that he is not 
allowed a rule of internal negation introduction. R is the most obvious candidate for 
such a rule, and it meets Sonderholm’s objection. Thus, pace Sonderholm, quasi-realism 
has not yet broken its promise to make expressivism non-revisionist.10 
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